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Abstract: 
Research evaluation is praised as the symbol of modern quality management. We claim firstly, that 
performance evaluations in research have higher costs than normally assumed, because the evaluated 
persons and institutions systematically change their behavior and develop counter strategies. 
Moreover, intrinsic work motivation is crowded out and undesired lock-in effects take place. 
Secondly, the benefits of performance evaluations are questionable. Evaluations provide too little 
information relevant for decision-making. In addition, they lose importance due to new forms of 
scientific cooperation on the internet. Thirdly, there exist superior alternatives. They consist in 
careful selection and supportive process coaching – and then leave individuals and research 
institutions to direct themselves. 
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1 Performance Evaluations: Expectations and Disappointments 
Performance evaluations have become a standard procedure in quality and performance management 
in many organizations. This procedure today is applied in profit-oriented firms, non-profit and 
governmental institutions. A particularly important area has been research evaluation on which this 
paper concentrates. Research evaluation is often praised as the symbol of modern quality management 
which today has diffused through the academic system. There are several academic journals (e.g. 
“Evaluation”, “Evaluation Quarterly”, “Evaluation Review”, “Research Evaluation”, 
“Scientometrics”) specifically devoted to the approach. Economics of evaluation has emerged as an 
academic discipline (e.g. Backes-Gellner and Moog 2004). “Evaluations of evaluations” or meta-
evaluations are discussed (e.g. Cook and Gruder 1978). “Evaluation” here is defined as a formal, 
retrospective and external appraisal of performance of persons or organizations. Evaluations are 
undertaken by other persons and not by the persons whose performance is to be assessed. Our 
definition corresponds both to the academic and practical use of the term. Thus, for example Brook 
(2002: 173) states „By evaluation, I shall mean the situation where visiting experts come from outside 
your organization or system and say what they think about it“. The usefulness of evaluations is rarely 
questioned though some observers call it a fad (Birnbaum 2000), or “audit explosion” (Power 1994), 
leading to an “audit society” (Power 1997), and producing a well-developed, booming evaluation 
bureaucracy and evaluation industry (Muller-Camen and Salzgeber 2005). But even the skeptics see 
no alternative instruments for raising the quality of research and allocating scarce resources (e.g. 
Daniel 1993; Gioia and Corley 2002; Holcombe 2004; Starbuck 2004; Weingart 2005).  
This paper claims firstly, performance evaluations have higher costs than normally assumed in 
practical applications as well as in the academic literature. Secondly, the benefits of performance 
evaluations are questionable. Thirdly, there exist superior alternatives.  
The rather obvious costs of evaluation exercises in terms of manpower have been much complained 
about (e.g. Kieser 1998; de Bruijn 2001). This includes not only the effort and time expended by the 
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evaluators. Perhaps more important are the costs borne by the evaluatees who have to provide 
voluminous evidence of their performance to meet the sophisticated systems of surveillance (Parker 
and Jary 1995:319) introduced for example in the United Kingdom.1 Our paper thus does also not 
focus on the difficulties of measuring performance. Obviously there are limitations of peer reviews 
and bibliometric indicators. Many empirical analyses of the peer reviews reveal that peer evaluations 
diverge, contradict each other and are not consistent over time (e.g. Cichetti 1991; Gans und Shepherd 
1994; Campanario 1996, 1998; Starbuck 2005).2 Bibliometric measurements of publications, 
citations, and co-citations as an answer to the growing skepticisms with peer reviews are also subject 
to major shortcomings, and can therefore not substitute for peer reviews with its own shortcomings 
(e.g. Üsdiken and Pasadeos 1995; Gmür 2003; Weingart 2005). These are important considerations 
but they have been extensively treated elsewhere. In this paper we focus on the hidden, and therefore 
often disregarded costs of performance evaluation.  
The hidden costs of evaluation consist of two main types, discussed in the first part of the paper:  
(1) Evaluations distort incentives by (a) undue reliance on a restricted set of indicators (“you get 
what you measure”), discussed in economics as the multiple-task problem, (b) counter-
strategies to the evaluation exercise; (c) crowding-out of intrinsic motivation of persons 
evaluated as well as evaluators; 
(2) Evaluations induce undesired lock-in effects on the part of evaluated persons or institutions as 
well as on the part of evaluators. 
The benefits of evaluations are usually taken for granted and remain unquestioned. The expected 
effects of evaluation exercises are efficient quality control, efficient allocation of resources, 
promotion of performance, and improved transparency of activity to principals, customers and 
suppliers. In particular, research evaluation is supposed to provide an effective signal to government 
agencies, sponsors, potential students, and their future employers about the reputation of research 
                                 
1 For a detailed description of the evaluation process of management research in the United Kingdom see Bessant et al. 
(2003)  
2 For a defense of peer reviews see e.g. Daniel (2005). 
  
4 
institutions. We argue in the second part of this paper that, firstly, evaluations provide too little 
information relevant for decision-making. Secondly, evaluations (in particular university rankings) 
lose importance due to new forms of scientific cooperation on the internet.  
The third part of the paper is devoted to alternatives to formal, retrospective and external evaluations 
of performance. They consist in  
(1) an interactive and supporting coaching of persons and institutions (concurrent process 
control).  
(2) a careful selection and socialization of persons charged with performing the activities in 
question (ex ante input control).  
This paper does not provide a verdict on whether performance evaluations should be undertaken or 
not. This would, of course, require a comparison of all the costs with all the benefits. To the extent to 
which our analysis is correct, the hidden costs identified here should be added to the costs so far 
considered, and the benefits accordingly reduced. As a consequence, performance evaluation becomes 
less desirable. The intensity and frequency of evaluations should be markedly reduced and substituted 
by the alternatives sketched out.  
2 Hidden Costs of Evaluation 
2.1. Evaluations Distort Incentives 
In general it is taken for granted that evaluations have beneficial effects on performance. In standard 
economics as well as in everyday life it is assumed that performance measurement and performance 
pay raise performance. The search for monetary incentives has come to permeate firms, governments 
and research institutes. In contrast, the negative incentive effects of evaluations are rarely considered. 
Performance evaluations lead to costs, which arise because the evaluatees systematically change their 
behavior in an unintended way. 
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2.1.1 What is not measured is disregarded  
Persons and institutions subject to an evaluation have an incentive to perform well in those areas of 
their work considered in the evaluation process. In contrast, they have no incentive to perform well in 
those criteria which are disregarded (Kerr 1975). The phenomenon has been extensively studied in 
modern economics under the heading of “multiple tasking” (Holmström and Milgrom 1991; Gibbons 
1998; Prendergast 1999; Fehr und Schmidt 2004). Academic research, characterized by highly 
incomplete contracts (Masten, forthcoming), has to deal with this problem in several aspects.  
Pressure towards “normal science” in the sense of Kuhn (1962). The measurement exerts not only 
pressure to produce predictable but unexciting research outcomes that can be published quickly 
(Prichard and Wilmott 1997; Muller-Camen and Salzgeber 2005). More importantly, path-breaking 
contributions are exactly those at variance with accepted criteria. Indeed innovative research creates 
novel criteria which before were unknown or disregarded. The referee process, by necessity based on 
the opinions of average peers finds it difficult to appreciate creative and unorthodox contributions 
(Frey 2003). The literature in the history of science suggests that the referee system rewards the 
mainstream. Many rejections in highly ranked journals are documented regarding papers that later 
were awarded high prizes, even the Nobel Prize (Gans and Shepherd 1994; Campanario 1996). Many 
of luminaries in science such as Newton, Darwin, Kant, Mendel, Schopenhauer, Semmelweis, 
Wittgenstein and Goedel would have had little chance in this peer review system (Fischer 1998; 
Pasternak 2000; Gillies 2005a). Their path breaking radical innovations in generals can only be 
appreciated after decades but not within the short evaluation cycles such as the four to five year 
British Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). It would be mistaken to assume that these are atypical 
and unfortunate special cases (Weingart 2005). Creative minds often are hindered or even suppressed 
by peer evaluations.  
Eliminating type II errors instead of type I errors. Referring to the theory of statistical tests Gillies 
(2005a, 2006) shows severe shortcomings of evaluations like the British Research Assement Exercise 
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(RAE). These evaluations are not devoted to eliminate errors of the type I, but only aim to eliminate 
type II errors. 
 Type I errors occur if the test leads to the rejection of a hypothesis which is in fact true. A type I error 
in evaluation leads to funding being withdrawn from a researcher or a research program which would 
have obtained important results had it been continued. The solution of the research problem will 
remain undiscovered for a long time. A notable example is the case of Semmelweis (Gillies 2005b) 
who did research on the causes of the childbed fever in 1848, which was at the time the main cause of 
death in childbirth. Semmelweis (1861) followed a procedure similar to Popper`s  conjectures and 
refutations (Popper 2002). The vast majority of the medical profession rejected his approach and 
ignored the practical recommendations based upon it. Semmelweis had to leave the Vienna Maternity 
Hospital in 1850, where he did his research. The hospitals went through a severe crisis and thousands 
of patients lost their lives. Only in the mid 1880s the new antiseptic methods based on Semmelweis`s 
work had become general.  
Type II errors occur if the test leads to the confirmation of a hypothesis which is in fact false. These 
errors are less serious than type I errors. A type II error leads to funding being continued which in the 
end obtains no good results. The worst that can happen as a consequence of a type II error is that 
some money is spent for nothing. Unfortunately most evaluations concentrate exclusively on 
eliminating type II errors in order to make research more cost effective. 
To avoid the serious consequences of type I errors, Gillies (2005a) therefore strongly argues that 
funding bodies should make sure that at least some funding is given to every research school rather 
than concentrating on the hopeless task trying to foresee which approach will prove to be successful 
in the long run. 
Homogenization of research endeavors. On the institutional level departments that have their eyes on 
rankings and evaluations tend to become more and more similar, undermining the necessary variety in 
scientific discourse (see Holcombe 2004 for case of economics departments). They prefer to hire in 
the standard fields that get more citations or grants and avoid individuals whose work is outside the 
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mainstream. Gioia and Corley (2002) argue that in business schools, rankings raise incentives to 
invest in short term management fads instead of  investments in resources for basic research, which in 
management research follows heterogeneous approaches.    
Underestimation of work committed to the dialogue between academics and practitioners. Academic 
work of relevance to real world phenomena is often disregarded. Research departments give no credit 
to faculties who write books and magazine articles designed to intermediate between the research 
community and the general public because they don’t contribute to the citation record. As a 
consequence, the gap between rigor and relevance of research is deepened and the dialogue between 
science and practice is undermined. 3 
Incentives to conduct expensive research. The tendency to measure research performance by the size 
of grants received creates an incentive to undertake more expensive, rather than relevant research 
(Holcombe 2004). Grants, of course, do not measure research output but rather resource input and 
have little to do with the scientific capabilities of an academic (Toutkoushian et al 2003). 
2.1.2 Counter strategies to evaluation exercises 
Evaluatees risking to lose from the evaluation exercise will rationally muster resources to fight against 
the findings. They are often able to neutralize the evaluation results ex post and ex ante.  
Ex post neutralization of evaluation results. Evaluatees have strong incentives to manipulate 
unpropitious results ex post. Firstly, they can come forth with new criteria according to which they 
perform well or which are important to the decision-makers. Examples in research evaluation are 
criteria like teaching and administrative duties. Secondly, they claim that the low judgment of their 
performance is due to inadequate resources, discrimination of minorities, health problems, or simply 
bad luck. Thirdly, losers refer to alternative ratings or rankings in which they fare better. It is well 
known that there are always such alternatives available. Inconsistent university rankings are a striking 
                                 
3 See Kieser and Nicolai (2005) for a discussion of rigor versus relevance in management research, which in their view is 
inevitable.  
  
8 
example.4 All these arguments against the validity of a particular evaluation may be well taken or not; 
what matters is that they consume a large amount of attention, time, and effort, thus seriously 
distracting from research. 
Ex ante manipulation of performance criteria. Less visible, though even more important, are strategic 
ex ante reactions of evaluatees intending to make forthcoming evaluations more favorable to 
themselves and their organization. There are many possibilities for such strategies that individually 
are rational but represent collectively unproductive and distorting rent-seeking. In political economy 
this effect is well known as „Goodhart’s Law“(1975) or „Lucas Critique“ (1976) and it has been 
empirically tested ( e.g.. Chrystal and Mizen 2003, Brück and Stephan 2006). At the micro level it is 
known that in schools evaluations can be manipulated by “teaching to the test”, excluding bad pupils 
from tests (for empirical evidence in USA see Figlio und Getzler 2003), or putting lower quality 
students in special classes which are not included in the measurement sample (Corley and Gioia 
2000). Scholars are encouraged to rank competing schools low to avoid the risk of lowering the rank 
of their school (Argenti 2000). Much has been written about managers who “cook the books” to raise 
their “pay for performance” (Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Frey and Osterloh 2005; Osterloh and Frey 
2000, 2005, forthcoming; Foss et al. 2006). In scientific publishing such strategies are undertaken by 
authors, editors and referees wearing different hats as evaluatees (Lawrence 2003).  
Authors raise their number of publications by dividing their research results to a “least publishable 
unit” (Weingart 2005:125), slicing them up as thin as salami and submitting them to different journals 
(Lawrence 2003: 259). Authors may also offer to include another scholar among the authors in 
exchange for being put as co-authors on his or her paper. Time and energy is wasted by trying to 
influence editors by courting them e.g. by unnecessarily citing them. More serious are manipulations 
of data and results. In addition to cheating there is a wide-spread misbehavior. In a questionnaire 
among 8,000 scientists in the United States about one third admitted behavior such as “cooking” 
research data, using the idea of others without appropriate reference, or failing to present data that 
contradict one`s own previous research (Martinson et al. 2005). The change of publication practices in 
                                 
4 For rankings of business schools and economic departments see e.g .Stake (1998),  Dichev (1999), Thursby (2000), 
Küpper and Ott (2002).  
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response to funding based on evaluations has been demonstrated in a study for Australia (Butler 
2003). The mid-1990s saw a linking of the number of peer-reviewed publications to the funding of 
universities and individual scholars. The number of publications increased dramatically but the 
quality measured by citations decreased. As a result, Australia fell behind all OECD countries with 
respect to quality of research (Weingart 2005:126). Of course, the process does not stop there. When 
the evaluators realize that their evaluation is undermined by maximizing quantity and disregarding 
quality (as reflected in citations) they will introduce the number of citations as quality measure. When 
authors adjust to this measure by maximizing the number of citations (e.g. by using citation cartels), 
the next step is weighing citations by impact factors, whose validity in turn is subject to strong 
criticism (see e.g. Adam 2002). As a consequence, an endless process of more and more sophisticated 
but useless evaluations emerges. As a whole, „Success in the evaluation process can become a more 
significant target than success in research itself“ (Brook 2002: 176). 
Some editors freely admit that they induce authors to cite as many publications in their journal as 
possible in order to raise their impact factor (Smith 1997, Garfield 1997). They also like to see 
themselves cited in the papers submitted.  
Referees are prone to judge more favorably papers that approvingly cite their own work and tend to 
reject papers threatening their previous work (Lawrence 2005: 260).5 Willingly or unwillingly 
referees induce authors to change their papers in order to secure acceptance. Bedeian (2003) finds 
evidence that not less than 25 percent of authors revised their manuscripts according to the 
suggestions of the referee though they knew that the change was incorrect. Frey (2003) calls this 
behavior “academic prostitution”. It has often been lamented that referees steal ideas from the papers 
they evaluate. Similar strategic reactions occur in other peer review processes like evaluations of 
research projects or academic institutions, which are a major source of funding in all countries today.  
If one considers the whole process including the reactions of authors, editors, and referees, the 
evaluation exercise has gained a life of its own even among those who should be involved in the very 
                                 
5 Such problems of sabotage in tournaments have been extensively discussed in personnel economics see e.g. Lazear (1995).   
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content of the scholarly discussion. The effect of the institutionalized evaluation process is not to 
improve the outcome but rather to move competition to an area where the critical academic discourse 
is weakened and substituted by signaling through publishing in peer reviewed journals. The “quality 
stamp” given by peer-reviewed journals induces scholars to cite research results without ever 
checking them. According to the study by Simkin and Roychowdhury (2003) on average only twenty 
percent of cited papers were ever read by the citing authors. As a result of these distortions a “rat-
race” (Akerlof 1976) is taking place where competition does not lead to positive outcomes but rather 
leads to an inefficient use of scholarly resources. It intensifies and rewards those scholars engaging in 
collectively unproductive rent-seeking activities and distorts the working of, and undermines trust in 
the scholarly system. These costs normally are not taken into account when evaluation exercises are 
considered. Therefore, the usefulness of evaluations is highly questionable. Academia is moving 
towards the direction of a bureaucratic planning system in which the formal evaluation system has 
become an independent entity exerting a new kind of censorship (Biagioli 2002). Instead of 
competition, the institutions of a planned economy are introduced.  
This process is comparable to the introduction of benefit-costs analyses into political decision-
making. In contrast to what has been claimed by its supporters, and expected by parliaments and other 
political decision-making bodies, the main effect was not at all to improve the decision-making 
process. Rather, the discussion moved towards a more abstract and formalized level. A negative 
consequence is that the ordinary citizens find it more difficult to participate in the deliberations 
because they are not able to use the language of costs-benefit analysis. The well organized groups, 
including public bureaucracy, benefit at the cost of ordinary citizens (see Self 1975). This is true not 
only in political decision-making, but also in the academic field: Users of research results are 
excluded from the evaluation process though it would be crucial to consider their views (Kieser 
1989). 
 
2.1.3 Crowding-Out of Intrinsic Work Motivation 
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The application of performance evaluation under known conditions has negative consequences on the 
intrinsic work motivation of evaluatees as well as evaluators (see Frey 1997; Osterloh and Frey 2000; 
Lindenberg 2001; Frey and Osterloh (eds.) 2002; Fehr und Gächter 2002; Bénabou and Tirole 2003; 
Weibel 2006; Falk and Kosfeld forthcoming). The crowding-out effect has been analyzed by 
psychologists and economists in hundreds of laboratory experiments. The most recent and extensive 
meta-studies are Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999 and Cameron, Banko and Pierce 2001 as well as the 
econometric studies of real life events (Frey and Oberholzer 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; for a 
survey of the empirical evidence, see Frey and Jegen 2001). For simple tasks, this is of little 
consequence, but it is generally acknowledged that for qualified, innovative and artistic work, 
intrinsic incentives are of decisive importance (Osterloh forthcoming). This aspect has been almost 
totally neglected with respect to research evaluations.  
An evaluation exercise has two undermining effects on the intrinsic motivation of researchers. The 
first is that researchers cannot pursue their intrinsic motivated research but rather must legitimize their 
research activity according to criteria appreciated by the evaluators. They are forced to find and state 
goals in line with the evaluators. The second undermining effect is brought about by the close 
connection between evaluation and monetary rewards. Intrinsically motivated scholars getting funds 
may shift their interest from the research itself to the money. This is known as the “overjustification 
effect” which substitutes internal by external incentives (Kruglanski et al. 1978) and thus may 
undermine creative research.   
Performance evaluation does not necessarily have to undermine intrinsic work motivation for two 
reasons. Firstly, if the evaluation is perceived to be supportive, work morale tends to be enhanced. 
The same occurs if the evaluatees enjoy being the center of attention of the evaluators (the so-called 
“Hawthorne Effect”). The two conditions are likely to be obtained when performance evaluation is 
newly introduced. But once it has become a continual exercise, it increasingly tends to be perceived as 
controlling, crowding out intrinsic work motivation. Secondly, performance evaluation may increase 
work effort if the crowding out effect is overcompensated by the relative price effect (Gneezy and 
Rustichini 2000). In the extreme case, if intrinsic motivation is totally crowded out by evaluation 
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exercises, research can only be induced by further monetary incentives. But it is doubtful whether 
innovative research can therewith be achieved (Amabile 1996, 1998). Evaluations are moreover taken 
as signaling a loss of trust in the evaluatees, tending to erode professional ethical norms (Kieser 
1998). 
Evaluation exercises may also negatively affect the intrinsic motivation of evaluators. In many cases 
(e.g. in the approach pursued by of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 2005) the 
evaluators are put into a straightjacket of formalized procedures leaving little or no room for aspects 
considered important from the personal point of view. They have to perform within a bureaucratic 
formal evaluation system. In such an environment evaluators have no scope to act in a role of 
participants in an intellectual discourse, which often was the reason to engage in a particular 
evaluation process. 
2.2 Lock-in Effects 
Once an evaluation system is in place in a particular organization even those members who are aware 
of the hidden costs and questionable benefits are rational not to oppose it. If they would, they are 
easily accused of being afraid of the consequences. Therefore, it is a better strategy to go along, 
understand the rules and play the game. As a consequence it appears that most, if not all members of 
the organization evaluation exercises accept the evaluation imposed, though in fact they are only 
resigned because they see no other option. 
Evaluators are also locked into the system. Scholars are invited to participate in evaluation exercises 
often because they have a personal or professional relationship to the persons or institutions to be 
evaluated. Once they have agreed, they have little or no incentive to oppose the bureaucratic 
procedures involved. They therewith become part of a quasi-socialist planning system, supporting its 
further existence.  
Because both evaluatees and evaluators are locked into the system, formal evaluations are expected to 
persist for a considerable time. 
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3 Questionable Benefits of Evaluations 
Performance evaluations are often of little or no use for three quite different reasons.  
3.1 Redundant or Contestable Information Provided 
In many cases information provided by evaluations is used only to bolster political decisions already 
made beforehand (Mittelstrass 2000). These decisions are mostly based on obvious criteria. In the 
case of a formal evaluation of particular individuals, substantial decisions (in particular promoting a 
person to an important new position or, in contrast, firing him or her) will only be taken if the 
evidence seems to be clear – and in the majority of the cases this is quite well known before the 
formal evaluation has been undertaken. The decision makers often are sure whether a person performs 
above or below average6. The same holds for the evaluation of projects and institutions. In that case 
also, the formal evaluation at best serves to support what is already clear. 
However, in some cases, new information is provided by the result of evaluations – but such 
additional information rarely leads to changes in decisions. When the evaluation produces surprising 
information about performance, it is easy to put it into doubt or to manipulate it at will (e.g. by 
changing the weight of the various components in the evaluation). For example, there have been many 
evaluations of possible sites for nuclear refuse deposits. There have virtually been hundreds of studies 
costing millions and even billions of Dollars and Euros but in almost no case a clear decision could be 
reached on the basis of that method. (e.g. the discussion on the Yucca Mountain in the US, see 
Portney 1991, Rabe 1994, Easterling and Kunreuther 1995). 
3.2 Information Irrelevant for Decision-making 
An evaluation should capture the marginal effect on performance of additional resources. How would 
performance change if an institution or a researcher could dispose over more or less means? This 
question is difficult to answer because it depends on a large number of conditions. An evaluation 
considering marginal performance effects is much more costly to undertake than the evaluations 
                                 
6 Nevertheless they often fail in assessing the performance of individuals, see Latham et al 2005. 
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considering absolute performance levels. Hence, the balance between the benefits and costs of 
evaluations is worsened. Accordingly, the consequence of a positive or a negative evaluation of a 
person or institution remains unclear. Should the resources available to the institutions and researchers 
evaluated as “bad” be reduced? Or should they be given additional means so that they can improve 
the quality of their research? Should the resources available to those evaluated as “good” or 
“excellent” be kept constant (or even be reduced) because they prove to be successful? These 
questions suggest that the result of an evaluation based on performance levels leaves an essential 
aspect unanswered. 
3.3 Rankings Lose Importance 
The internet has fundamentally modified the production process taking place in research institutes as 
well as in knowledge production in general. A thoroughly conducted study by Kim, Morse and 
Zingales (2006) reveals that the position of leading universities loses importance. While in the 1970s 
residence in an elite university had a sizeable impact on individual research productivity (measured by 
impact equivalent pages per year), in the 1990s this effect disappeared. Also the percentage of co-
authored papers with scholars of non-elite universities doubled. It follows that the externality of 
having better local research colleagues declines because it is easier to collaborate by internet with 
researchers located at any other university.  
4 Alternatives to Formal Retrospective Evaluations 
The often disregarded hidden costs and underperformance of formal, retrospective evaluations would 
matter little if there were no alternatives. Indeed, it has often been claimed that no reasonable 
alternatives exist (e.g. Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 2005). But there are superior 
alternatives. In the following, three alternatives to formal, retrospective controls are discussed: 
Concurrent process control, input control, and a combination of process and input control. These 
alternatives refer to insights from managerial control theory (e.g. Thompson 1967; Ouchi 1977, 1979; 
Eisenhardt 1985). A major result of that theory is that the kind of evaluation or control system (output 
control, process control, input control) must fit the characteristics of the knowledge available to the 
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evaluator (Turner and Makhija 2006). These characteristics are defined on the one hand by 
“knowledge of measurability and attributability of outputs”. On the other hand, they are defined by 
“knowledge of cause/effect relations” (Thompson (1967) or “knowledge of the transformation 
process” (Ouchi 1979).  The relationships between control forms and knowledge available to the 
evaluator are summarized in Figure 1 and discussed below. We concentrate on output control, process 
control, and input control (cell 1, 2 and 3) because it is quite clear that activities that can be controlled 
by outputs and well defined processes  (cell 4) characterize simple tasks apart from research. It is 
important to keep in mind, however, that all organizations, including research organizations, employ a 
combination of control types, though with different emphasis. 
 
FIGURE 1: 
Relationship Between Control Forms and Knowledge Available to the Evaluator 
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Output control  (cell 1) is based on well-defined indicators, which is the essence of formal, 
retrospective evaluations and in particular rankings. Examples for such indicators in research are e.g. 
the number of published articles in refereed journals or citations. Since output controls do not specify 
the processes or cause-effect relations that produce that outputs, such a control type is most 
appropriate when process or cause-effect relations are difficult to specify as long as the outputs are 
measurable. Output controls are attractive to non-experts, like politicians, journalists, and bureaucrats. 
This is the reason why newspapers love output controls in the form of rankings, because rankings 
seem so provide easy to understand quality signals. Moreover, this kind of control gives the controlled 
person or institution a certain measure of discretion how to reach certain goals or sub-goals, which 
has been discussed intensely in the “management by objectives” approach (e.g. Lawler and Rhode 
1976) and in the literature about modularization (e.g. Baldwin and Clark 2000; Fleming and Sorenson 
2001; Langlois 2002). 
 However, there are some preconditions of output control which are lacking in the case of research. 
Firstly, the knowledge relating to the output must be stable and not subject to change (Snell 1992). In 
research, desired outputs are ambiguous and the criteria of what constitutes good research are 
changing, in particular when radical innovations (Christensen and Bower 1996) or paradigm shifts 
(Kuhn 1962) are concerned. In these cases, the usefulness of established knowledge and of well-
defined indicators is put into question. Secondly, outputs must be observable and attributable 
(Eisenhardt 1985). Today’s research is characterized by intensive pooled interdependencies between 
the various scholars involved in a research enterprise and therefore often lacks attributability to 
particular scholars and even institutions. As a consequence, research quality cannot well be captured 
by output-oriented evaluations like e.g. rankings.7 If they are nevertheless applied, multi-task 
problems emerge which distort incentives (see section 2.1) and lead to risk-adverse and imitative 
behavior (Ouchi 1977).8  
                                 
7 At best, one could argue for a variety of rankings with diverse criteria to make clear that no single ranking can  meet  the 
requirements of scholarly work, see Gioia and Corley (2002: 118). 
8 But see Cardinal (2001). She finds that output control enhances radical innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. But the dependent 
variable – FDA approvals - might not well serve as an indicator of radical innovation, and might be subdue to the multiple task effect itself.  
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Fortunately, according to managerial control theory there exist adequate alternatives to output 
controls, namely input and process control or a combination of both. 
4.1 Process control: Interactive and supportive coaching 
As output control, and therefore formal output evaluations, do not work well in the field of research, 
process control may present a useful alternative (cell 2). The preconditions are that evaluators (a) have 
the appropriate knowledge of cause/effect relations or of the transformation process of inputs into 
outputs and (b) have a shared understanding of the rules obtained. This is often the case in academic 
peer review. Peer reviews are useful to make sure that well established standards of research 
methodology are met. However, as argued above, peer reviews have major shortcomings when 
unorthodox contributions are to be evaluated. As a consequence, process control works sufficiently 
only in the case of “normal science” (Kuhn 1962) or incremental innovations.9 Normal science 
exploits potentials of established knowledge and introduces relatively little changes to it. Applying 
process control to radical innovations or to paradigmatic shifts has major shortcomings, because there 
is little agreement about which criteria are applicable and which are not. In these cases, process 
control or peer evaluation can only be used if it takes the form of an interactive research process 
between evaluator and evaluatee in which new criteria are jointly developed.  However, in this case 
the roles of evaluator and evaluatee are intermingled. The evaluator is no longer an external, 
independent outsider but is inevitably involved as a contributor to the research itself.  
4.2 Input control: Careful Selection and Training as Alternative 
Neither output control nor process control work suffiently when measurability and attributability of 
outputs is not given and the external evaluators´ knowledge of the transformation process is limited. 
This is the case in most knowledge work and in particular in basic research endeavors. In these cases, 
input control in the form of careful selection and training is central (cell 3). In managerial control 
theory this type of control is also called “clan control” (Ouchi 1979). Selection and socialization has 
to make sure that candidates become members of a community in which aligned norms and values are 
                                 
9 It should be noted that sometimes there are conflicting logics between science and innovation in industry, see Gittelman and Kogut (2003) 
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internalized and are part of their intrinsic motivation. Input control represents prospective controls, 
regulates antecedent conditions of performance and manages potentials (Snell 1992). This is of 
particular importance for knowledge work, as social relationships matter for knowledge creation, 
retention, and transfer (Kogut and Zander 1996; Argote et al. 2003; Nickerson and Zenger 2004)10. If 
input control is successful, mutual tolerance for ambiguity is possible, which is important in 
production processes where output measurement is questionable and procedural rules are unclear. 
This makes input control the main form of control for all kinds of knowledge work, in particular for 
basic research.  
The strategy is to use resources to find the persons best suited for a job and to consider how he or she 
is likely to perform in the future - and then to have trust that he or she will indeed perform well. Thus, 
after a careful selection and training one has to abstain from external evaluations in terms of output 
and to some extent also in terms of process control. Such a control approach to scientific research was 
emphasized by the famous President of Harvard University James Bryan Conant (Renn 2002):  
„There is only one proved method of assisting the advancement of pure science – 
that is picking men of genius, backing them heavily, and leaving them to direct 
themselves.“ (Letter to the New York Times, 13. August 1945). 
This view is still part of the „Principles Governing Research at Harvard, stating: 11 
„ The primary means for controlling the quality of scholarly activities of this 
Faculty is through the rigorous academic standards applied in selection of its 
members“ 
Input control as main control form does not apply to the whole academic career. During the 
socialization and selection process much output and process control must take place. They have to 
ensure that the candidate knows the rules of scholarly work, meets the established standards of 
research methods, is performing in an efficient way, and has sufficient intrinsic motivation to work on 
                                 
10 But see Nooteboom (2000) for a discussion of the problem of optimal cognitive distance and cognitive proximity in 
knowledge production 
11  See http://www.fas.harvard.edu/research/greybook/principles.html. 
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its own. These criteria serve as basis of trust in the ability, willingness and creativity of a researcher 
and are the preconditions to meet ambiguous tasks. But it makes a great difference being submitted to 
output and process control during a whole life than being submitted to it during a certain, clearly 
delineated phase knowing that the appointment will imply a wide extent of autonomy and self-
determination.  
The lack of output and process control after the appointment as a full professor is likely to lead some 
researchers not to perform after having been appointed. But this is the necessary price to pay for the 
most able and innovative scholars to flourish. 
Selection and socialization processes combined with essentially putting faith in the persons chosen 
have been used with much success in many areas in society. It suffices to indicate three cases 
pertaining to some of the most important functions accorded to in society: 
(1) In most countries committed to the rule of law high judges after having been appointed are not 
subjected to any sort of ex post formal evaluation process. This applies to chief judges in the 
United States, or the Federal Judges in Germany and in Switzerland. In many countries, the 
highest judges are elected for life, and thus are not even subject to a re-election constraint. 
(2) The presidents and other top members of Central Banks are selected, and their performance is not 
evaluated by any sort of ex post evaluation. Often, they are elected for rather long periods. 
 (3) University professors were appointed for life, and not submitted to formal ex post evaluations, in 
countries such as Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom when they were the leading centers 
of scientific research (Gillies 2005a). 
In all three cases, the selection and socialization process is expected to be so careful that once it is 
taken one can trust that the persons selected have sufficient intrinsic motivation to perform well. For 
high judges and top members of central banks this principle has remained intact. In contrast, for 
universities this principle has recently been undermined. Notwithstanding, it is crucial for research 
and radical innovations because of three reasons: Firstly, individuals as well as institutions are not 
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induced to only focus on easily measurable dimensions of their task and to disregard tasks difficult to 
identify and measure. The distorting effects of multi-tasking and rat races are evaded. Secondly, the 
process of selection does not induce crowding out of intrinsic work motivation because the affected 
persons do not perceive it as controlling. As long as the selection process is considered to be 
procedurally fair (see Lind and Tyler 1988; Frey and Stutzer 2001 for empirical evidence on 
procedural utility) their intrinsic motivation tends to be raised rather than lowered.(Osterloh and 
Weibel 2006). This effect occurs for the persons chosen, but less so for the persons not selected. 
Institutions are therefore well advised to apply the “up or out” rule. This selection rule makes sense in 
cases where intrinsic motivation is crucial and when the not selected persons are expected to have a 
lower work morale.12 
4.3 Combination of input and process control 
Input and process control may usefully be combined when institutions, not persons, are to be 
evaluated. The selection process and the autonomy of researchers being selected and appointed 
constitute the essential condition for scholarly work. The process control of institutions therefore must 
ensure, firstly, that the selection process meets the requirements discussed above, namely a rigorous 
evaluation of the potential candidates, and, secondly, that they are granted as much autonomy as 
possible once appointed.13 Indeed, some highly productive knowledge producing companies today at 
least partly follow this rule. Examples are 3M, Siemens and Google. 14 These companies allow their 
researchers to spend fifteen to forty percent of their work time in pursuing self-chosen goals (Brand 
1998).15 This should, of course, apply even more strongly to academic research. 
 
                                 
12 This explanation for the “up or out” rule differs from the explanation in orthodox economics (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts 
1992: 379-382). In this literature “up or out” is understood as an instrument to overcome opportunism of decision makers 
and potential partners when performance is not contractable.  
13 This is the kind of evaluation the German Science Council (Deutscher Wissenschaftsrat) usually conducts. Recently the 
Wissenschaftsrat has decided to engage in a pilot study concerning a ranking of research institutions similar to the British 
Research Assessment Exercise (see Wissenschaftsrat 2004), which is the kind of output control we criticize in this paper. 
14 Another impressive example for how autonomy in knowledge productions  furthers productivity is open source software 
production, see Osterloh and Rota (forthcoming) 
15 The Google way is documented in  e.g. http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/02/20/08OPconnection_1.html  
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5 Conclusions 
This paper’s goal has been to identify and analyze hidden costs of formal ex post evaluations as well 
as its questionable benefits that have been neglected or treated lightly. It is not intended to present an 
overall judgment of the desirability of such methods. This would only be possible if all the benefits 
and costs were considered. However, in so far as the benefits and the costs normally considered 
remain constant, the identification of additional costs result in formal evaluation exercises being less 
desirable. 
Two main kinds of hidden costs were discussed: 
(1) Distorted incentives due to (a) identifying and measuring only some, but not all aspects of 
performance (the multi-task problem), (b) Counter strategies to the evaluation exercises, which 
induce blocking reactions by the persons negatively affected, and (c) crowding out intrinsic work 
motivation crucial for creative scholarly work; 
(2) Lock-in effects of evaluatees and evaluators leading to an undue persistence and expansion of 
bureaucratic interventions. 
While formal ex post evaluations have undoubted benefits, they are normally overestimated. The 
benefits of these evaluations are questionable for three reasons: 
(1) They often do not produce new information not already known by peers; 
(2)  The information produced is not helpful for a reasoned decision-making; 
(3) Rankings of universities lose importance due to the new possibilities of scientific cooperation 
via the internet. 
Some general, but important, conclusions follow from the analysis: 
- Retrospective formal evaluations are not a method to be successfully used nearly everywhere as it 
is the case today. They can not be considered a “modern” system of quality management, in 
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particular for individuals and institutions engaged in research. Rather, retrospective formal 
evaluations should be used sparingly. 
- Careful (ex ante) selection and socialization presents a superior alternative to ex post evaluation. 
The characteristic of a selection system is that once a decision has been made the principals put 
faith in the persons selected. Important positions in society (such as top judges and presidents of 
Central Banks) are elected either for life or for a very long time period without formal evaluations 
for good reasons. It is questionable why these reasons should not apply to research.  
-  The behavior of creative persons fulfilling ambiguous tasks of low programmability needs to be 
based on intrinsic motivation and the ability to direct themselves. The selection process must 
above all be directed to this goal. 
 -  Research institutions are to be evaluated by a combination of process and input control. The 
evaluation primarily has to assess whether the research organizations (a) select the most 
promising scholars, (b) back them with institutional rules securing them autonomy, and (c) then 
leave them to direct themselves.  
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